by Kurt Madel
What are Pod Security Policies?
Although Kubernetes Pod Security Policies are still a beta feature of Kubernetes they are an important security feature that should not be overlooked. Pod Security Policies (PSPs) are built-in Kubernetes resources that allow you to enforce security related properties of every container in your cluster. If a container in a pod does not meet the criteria for an applicable PSP then it will not be scheduled to run.
Best Practices for CloudBees Core v2 on Kubernetes
There are numerous articles on security best practices for Kubernetes (to include this one published on the CNCF blog site). Many of these articles include similar best practices and most, if not all, apply to running Core v2 on Kubernetes. Some of these best practices are inherent in CloudBees’ documented install of Core v2 on Kubernetes, while others are documented best practices and are recommended next steps after your initial Core v2 installation.
Before we take a look at the best practices that aren’t necessarily covered by the CloudBees reference architectures and best practice documentation, I will provide a quick overview of what is already available with an OOTB Core v2 install and highlight some CloudBees documentation that speaks to other best practices for running Core v2 on Kubernetes more securely.
Enable Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
Although you can certainly install Core v2 on Kubernetes without RBAC enabled - the CloudBees install for Core v2 comes with RBAC pre-configured. Running Kubernetes with RBAC enabled is typically the default (it is for all the major cloud providers) and is always a recommended security setting.
Use Namespaces to Establish Security Boundaries & Separate Sensitive Workloads
CloudBees recommends that you create a
namespace specifically for Core v2 as part of the install. CloudBees also recommends establishing boundaries between your CloudBees Jenkins masters and agent workloads by setting up distinct node pools using taints and tolerations and assigning pods to specific node pools with node selectors.
Create and Define Cluster Network Policies
Although CloudBees doesn’t provide specific Kubernetes Network Policies, CloudBees does recommend using them and provides documentation for setting up a private and encrypted network for AWS EKS.
Run a Cluster-wide Pod Security Policy
At the time of this post, this is one component that is not documented as part of the CloudBees installation guides for Core v2 on Kubernetes and will be the focus of the rest of this post.
From the Kubernetes documentation on Pod Security Policies (PSPs): “Pod security policy control is implemented as an optional (but recommended) admission controller.” If you read any number of posts on security best practices for Kubernetes, pretty much all of them will mentions PSPs.
A CD platform, like CloudBees Core v2 on Kubernetes, is typically a multi-tenant service where security is of the utmost importance. In addition to multi-tenancy, when running CD workloads on a platform like Kubernetes there are typically other workloads deployed and if any workload does not have proper security configured it can impact all of the workloads running on the cluster.
The combination of PSPs with Kubernetes RBAC, namespaces and workload specific node pools allows for the granular security you need to ensure there are adequate safeguards in place to greatly reduce the risk of unintentional (and intentional) actions that breaks your cluster. PSPs provide additional safeguards along with targeted node pools, namespaces and service accounts. This allows for the flexibility needed by CI/CD users while providing adequate guard rails so they don’t negatively impact CD workloads or other important Kubernetes workloads by doing something stupid - accidental or otherwise.
Using Pod Security Policies with CloudBees Core v2
As mentioned above, Pod Security Polices are an optional Kubernetes feature (and still beta) so they are not enabled by default on most Kubernetes distributions - to include GCP GKE, and Azure AKS. PSPs can be created and applied to a
ClusterRole or a
Role resource definition without enabling the PodSecurityPolicy admission controller. This is very important, because once you enable the PodSecurityPolicy admission controller any
pod that does not have a PSP applied to it will not get scheduled.
NOTE: PSPs are enabled by default on AWS EKS 1.13 and above, but with a very permissive PSP that is the same as running EKS without PSPs.
We will define two PSPs for our Core v2 cluster:
- A very restrictive PSP used for all CloudBees components, additional Kubernetes services being leveraged with Core v2 and the majority of dynamic ephemeral Kubernetes based agents used by our Core v2 cluster:
apiVersion: policy/v1beta1 kind: PodSecurityPolicy metadata: name: cb-restricted annotations: seccomp.security.alpha.kubernetes.io/allowedProfileNames: 'docker/default' apparmor.security.beta.kubernetes.io/allowedProfileNames: 'runtime/default' seccomp.security.alpha.kubernetes.io/defaultProfileName: 'docker/default' apparmor.security.beta.kubernetes.io/defaultProfileName: 'runtime/default' spec: # prevents container from manipulating the network stack, accessing devices on the host and prevents ability to run DinD privileged: false fsGroup: rule: 'MustRunAs' ranges: # Forbid adding the root group. - min: 1 max: 65535 runAsUser: rule: 'MustRunAs' ranges: # Don't allow containers to run as ROOT - min: 1 max: 65535 seLinux: rule: RunAsAny supplementalGroups: rule: RunAsAny # Allow core volume types. But more specifically, don't allow mounting host volumes to include the Docker socket - '/var/run/docker.sock' volumes: - 'emptyDir' - 'secret' - 'downwardAPI' - 'configMap' # persistentVolumes are required for CJOC and Managed Master StatefulSets - 'persistentVolumeClaim' - 'projected' hostPID: false hostIPC: false hostNetwork: false # Ensures that no child process of a container can gain more privileges than its parent allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
Once the primary Core v2 PSP (
cb-restricted in this case) has been created you must update the
Roles to use it. CloudBees defines two Kubernetes
Roles for the Core v2 install on Kubernetes,
cjoc-master-management bound to the
ServiceAccount for provisioning Managed/Team Masters
StatefulSets from CJOC, and
cjoc-agents bound to the
ServiceAccount for scheduling dynamic ephemeral agent pods from Managed/Team Masters. The following Kubernetes configuration snippets show how this is configured:
--- kind: Role apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1beta1 metadata: name: cjoc-master-management rules: - apiGroups: ['extensions'] resources: ['podsecuritypolicies'] verbs: ['use'] resourceNames: - cb-restricted ... --- kind: Role apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1beta1 metadata: name: cjoc-agents rules: - apiGroups: ['extensions'] resources: ['podsecuritypolicies'] verbs: ['use'] resourceNames: - cb-restricted ...
The second PSP will be almost identical except for
RunAsUserwill be set to
RunAsAnyto allow running as
root- this is specifically to run Kaniko containers (read more about building containers as securely as possible with Kaniko), but there may be some other uses cases that require containers to run as
runAsUser: rule: 'RunAsAny'
Bind Restrictive PSP Role for Ingress Nginx
CloudBees recommends the ingress-nginx Ingress controller to manage external access to Core v2. The NGINX Ingress Controller is a top-level Kubernetes project and provides an example for using Pod Security Policies with the ingress-nginx
Deployment. Basically, all you have to do is run the following command before installing the NGINX Ingress controller:
kubectl apply -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/kubernetes/ingress-nginx/master/docs/examples/psp/psp.yaml
The above command will create the following PSP,
RoleBinding with the primary differences from the
cb-restricted PSP being the addition of the
NET_BIND_SERVICE as an
allowedCapabilities and allowing
hostPorts of 80 to 65535:
apiVersion: policy/v1beta1 kind: PodSecurityPolicy metadata: annotations: # Assumes apparmor available apparmor.security.beta.kubernetes.io/allowedProfileNames: 'runtime/default' apparmor.security.beta.kubernetes.io/defaultProfileName: 'runtime/default' seccomp.security.alpha.kubernetes.io/allowedProfileNames: 'docker/default' seccomp.security.alpha.kubernetes.io/defaultProfileName: 'docker/default' name: ingress-nginx spec: allowedCapabilities: - NET_BIND_SERVICE allowPrivilegeEscalation: true fsGroup: rule: 'MustRunAs' ranges: - min: 1 max: 65535 hostIPC: false hostNetwork: false hostPID: false hostPorts: - min: 80 max: 65535 privileged: false readOnlyRootFilesystem: false runAsUser: rule: 'MustRunAsNonRoot' ranges: - min: 33 max: 65535 seLinux: rule: 'RunAsAny' supplementalGroups: rule: 'MustRunAs' ranges: # Forbid adding the root group. - min: 1 max: 65535 volumes: - 'configMap' - 'downwardAPI' - 'emptyDir' - 'projected' - 'secret' --- apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1 kind: Role metadata: name: ingress-nginx-psp namespace: ingress-nginx rules: - apiGroups: - policy resourceNames: - ingress-nginx resources: - podsecuritypolicies verbs: - use --- apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1 kind: RoleBinding metadata: name: ingress-nginx-psp namespace: ingress-nginx roleRef: apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io kind: Role name: ingress-nginx-psp subjects: - kind: ServiceAccount name: default - kind: ServiceAccount name: nginx-ingress-serviceaccount
NOTE: You can also run that command after you have already installed the NGINX Ingress controller but the PSP will only be applied after restarting or recreating the ingress-nginx
Pod Security Policies for Other Services
The cluster used as an example for this post relies on the cert-manager Kubernetes add-on for automatically provisioning and managing TLS certificates for the Core v2 install on GKE. If cert-manager or other services are installed before you enable PSPs on your cluster then the
pods associated with them will not run if they are restarted if the associated
ClusterRoles don’t have PSPs applied to them. cert-manager is deployed to its own namespace so an easy way to ensure that all
ServiceAccounts associated with the cert-manager service have a PSP applied is to create a
ClusterRole with the PSP and then bind that
ClusterRole to all
ServiceAccounts in the applicable
ClusterRole with the cb-restricted PSP applied
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1 metadata: name: psp-restricted-clusterrole rules: - apiGroups: - extensions resources: - podsecuritypolicies resourceNames: - cb-restricted verbs: - use
RoleBindings for cert-manager
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1 kind: RoleBinding metadata: name: cert-manager-psp-restricted namespace: cert-manager roleRef: apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io kind: ClusterRole name: psp-restricted-clusterrole subjects: - apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io kind: Group name: system:serviceaccounts
NOTE: You can use this command
kubectl get role,clusterrole --all-namespacesto check your cluster for any other
ClusterRolesthat need to have a PSP applied to them. Remember, any
podthat is running under a
ServiceAccountthat doesn’t have a PSP will be shut down as soon as you enable the Pod Security Policy Admission Controller. For GKE you don’t need to apply PSPs to any
namespaceor any gce or system
ClusterRolesas GKE will automatically apply the necessary PSPs.
Enable the Pod Security Policy Admission Controller
Now that PSPs are applied to all the necessary
ClusterRoles you can enable the Pod Security Policy Admission Controller for your GKE cluster:
gcloud beta container clusters update [CLUSTER_NAME] --zone [CLUSTER_ZONE] --enable-pod-security-policy
Next, you should ensure that all
pods are still running:
kubectl get pods --all-namespaces
pod that you expect to be running is not, you need to find the
ClusterRole that is used for the
service and apply a PSP to it.
Default Pod Security Policies created when enabling the
pod-security-policy feature on a GKE cluster:
NAME PRIV CAPS SELINUX RUNASUSER FSGROUP SUPGROUP READONLYROOTFS VOLUMES gce.event-exporter false RunAsAny RunAsAny RunAsAny RunAsAny false hostPath,secret gce.fluentd-gcp false RunAsAny RunAsAny RunAsAny RunAsAny false configMap,hostPath,secret gce.persistent-volume-binder false RunAsAny RunAsAny RunAsAny RunAsAny false nfs,secret gce.privileged true * RunAsAny RunAsAny RunAsAny RunAsAny false * gce.unprivileged-addon false RunAsAny RunAsAny RunAsAny RunAsAny false emptyDir,configMap,secret
NOTE: The default Pod Security Policies created automatically cannot be modified - Google will automatically change them back to those above.
Oh no, My Jenkins Kubernetes Agents Won’t Start!
The Jenkins Kubernetes plugin (for ephemeral K8s agents) defaults to using a K8s
emptyDir volume type for the Jenkins agent workspace. This causes issues when using a restrictive PSP such at the cb-restricted PSP above. Kubernetes defaults to mounting
emptyDir volumes as
root:root with permissions set to
750 - as detailed by this GitHub issue opened way back in 2014. When using a PSP, with Jenkins K8s agent pods, that doesn’t allow containers to run as
root the containers will not be able to access the default K8s plugin workspace directory. One approach for dealing with this is to set the K8s
containers in the
pod spec. You can do this in the K8s plugin UI via the Raw yaml for the Pod field:
This can also be set in the raw yaml of a
pod spec that you load into your Jenkins job from a file:
pod spec with the
kind: Pod metadata: name: nodejs-app spec: containers: - name: nodejs image: node:10.10.0-alpine command: - cat tty: true - name: testcafe image: gcr.io/technologists/testcafe:0.0.2 command: - cat tty: true securityContext: runAsUser: 1000
2019-09-04 09:05 +0000
0364612 @ 2020-01-20